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In the wake of the failure of the UN climate negotiations
in December 2009, hindsight unfairly benefits any review
of the various manifestos on climate change policy pub-
lished before the Copenhagen meeting. The three books in
question – by a renowned sociologist (Giddens) and two
eminent economists (Nordhaus and Stern) – merit atten-
tion on the basis of their comprehensive assessments and
aspirations to global policy relevance. All recognise the
great difficulties in securing international agreement on
strong climate mitigation and adaptation measures, though
Giddens’ volume was the most prescient in anticipating the
lowest common denominator structure of the Copenhagen
Accord. Significantly, given the continuing attacks on the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), all
three authors also accept its scientific account of global
warming. In this review, I highlight the key differences in
their prescriptions for policy action to prevent dangerous
climate change, which can be characterised as ‘slow-ramp’ –
gradually increasing restraints on carbon emissions (Nord-
haus) – and ‘springboard’ – immediate deep cuts in emis-
sions, whether mainly by market mechanisms (Stern) or a
broader mix of policy instruments (Giddens).
Arguably the most significant provision in the Copenha-
gen Accord is the acceptance of the IPCC view that deep
cuts in greenhouse gas emissions are required to hold the
projected increase in global mean temperature to 2C
(compared to pre-industrial levels). Warming above 2
degrees is taken to be ‘dangerous anthropogenic inter-
ference with the climate system’, which parties have an
obligation to prevent under Article 2 of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
There remain uncertainties about how likely such a tem-
perature increase is in relation to predicted greenhouse gas
emissions and concentrations, yet the severity of the prob-
lem is acknowledged by each author. Stern is the clearest
in pinpointing the dangers: given current concentrations of
greenhouse gases at 430 parts per million (ppm) CO2
equivalent, he cites UK climate models indicating that the
chances of exceeding 2C are 78 per cent at 450 ppm and
96 per cent at 500 ppm. He claims that current emission
levels and atmospheric stocks of greenhouse gases render it
highly unlikely that concentrations can be kept below 450
ppm, so policy makers must strive to stay within an upper
limit of 500 ppm, which would at least provide a strong
chance of avoiding an even more harmful rise of 3C
(Stern, pp. 26–27). In other words, and this is not con-
tradicted by the short summaries on climate science in
Giddens and Nordhaus, ‘dangerous’ climate change is now
highly likely, so the policy challenge is how quick and deep
our emissions reductions should be to reduce this harm and
prevent more damaging future rises in temperature.
In choosing between possible trajectories for reducing
emissions, policy makers cannot avoid making judgements
both about future returns on capital and also how the
relative welfare of future generations is weighted in cur-
rent decision making. The rate at which we ‘discount’
future costs and benefits is critical to addressing the cli-
mate change problem, because there are significant uncer-
tainties in calculating the welfare impacts of something
affecting more than one generation. If, as Giddens and
Stern note most forcefully, dangerous climate change
poses a potentially catastrophic threat to future conditions
of human life on the planet, then the decision environ-
ment is even more fraught. There is a familiar collective
action dilemma here, which Giddens labels, seemingly
without irony, ‘Giddens’s paradox’ (Giddens, p. 2): how
to craft effective policies in the face of high-consequence
risks which fail to register as immediate and tangible
dangers?
A clear division between Nordhaus and Stern on the
issue of discounting largely accounts for their respective
support for the slow-ramp and springboard approaches to
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climate policy. For Nordhaus the present and future welfare
of humans is best served by slowly increasing carbon taxes
in the short term, then ratcheting these up in subsequent
decades. It is efficient now, he claims, to direct higher-
yield investments elsewhere, generating returns that can be
allocated to more cost-effective climate mitigation technol-
ogies in the future. This approach rests on a social welfare
function, derived from neoclassical economics, which dis-
counts future economic goods using an estimated market
return on capital of 4 per cent, which is seen as consistent
with current market rates of return (Nordhaus, p. 10). Yet,
as Stern convincingly argues, it is simply misleading to
infer intergenerational values by this method in the climate
change context of distorted or absent markets: ‘there are no
markets which can reveal how a generation, faced with the
prospect of inflicting massive changes on future genera-
tions, should behave’ (Stern, p. 87). Significantly, Nordhaus
concedes that the Dynamic Integrated model of Climate
and the Environment (DICE) he employs has limited util-
ity in modelling the potentially abrupt and catastrophic
consequences from climate change (Nordhaus, pp. 143–
147): indeed, to function methodologically, it needs high
discounting of future risks.
Stern is more upfront than Nordhaus (and surprisingly
also Giddens) on the ethical issues at stake in policy inter-
ventions to address dangerous climate change. His moral
justification for springboard actions – early and decisive
action to hold CO2 equivalent concentrations below 500
ppm – starts with the observation that, even within the
‘revealed ethics’ approach of Nordhaus, it is implausible to
select a discount rate derived from imperfect capital mar-
kets rather than, say, the lower interest rates of long-term
securities. It is well known that the Stern Review on cli-
mate change economics set social discount rates more in
line with the latter. However, in A Blueprint for a Safer
Planet, Stern is more circumspect about the use of social
welfare discounting to prescribe policy on climate change.
He calls for an explicit treatment of ethical decisions and
values, including an openness to approaches beyond the
utilitarian constructs of neoclassical economics. While his
own social democratic position is flagged up, it is made
clear that it must find political legitimacy in processes of
inclusive deliberation.
For Giddens the threat of dangerous climate change also
justifies ambitious emissions reductions, in which industria-
lised countries act first in light of their historical pollution
record, their technical capabilities for climate mitigation
and their economic capacity to assist developing countries
adapt to the damaging impacts of climate change. All these
points resonate with UNFCCC obligations on parties.
More original is his argument that, in order to secure
enduring public support, springboard policy actions must
rest on a ‘radicalism of the centre’ (Giddens, p. 114) that
disavows left–right ideological exchanges and also green
political values. In a provocative but insightful chapter, he
reviews a number of normative concepts with roots in the
green movement – the precautionary principle, sustainable
development, overdevelopment and polluter pays (Giddens,
pp. 49–72). Only the last two survive his critical scrutiny,
taking their place in a list of concepts that should serve, he
argues, as the normative basis for a political concordat to
address climate change. The concordat is discussed only in
terms of democratic states (Giddens, pp. 113–117), begging
the question of its applicability to other types of political
system.
Of course, effective measures to address climate change
require the fullest possible international cooperation. Each
author favours the globally harmonised use of market-
based mechanisms in climate change policy. In part, this
reflects the notion that ‘optimal’ policy responses should
be economically efficient – that marginal abatement costs
equal the marginal social cost of emissions. In his analy-
sis Nordhaus clings to this idealised model, which under-
pins his championing of price-based carbon taxes over
quantity-based cap-and-trade schemes (Nordhaus, pp.
148–164). He argues that climatic constraints, such as
concentration and temperature limits, are irrational from
an economic perspective: according to the DICE model,
staying within the Copenhagen Accord limit of 2C
would require high suboptimal carbon taxes, with a net
loss in global economic welfare of $1.6 trillion (present
value) by the end of this century compared to a net gain
in the ‘optimal’ policy of $3.4 trillion, which involves a
global temperature change of 2.61C by 2100, and
3.45C by 2200 (Nordhaus, pp. 69–73, 82–83). This
assumes a global economic future in which the risks of
higher climate change outcomes are outweighed by the
consumptive gains of a richer world; in other words, that
welfare losses caused by (potential) climate change dam-
age can be compensated from other sources. In a world
of dangerous climate change, this assumption is highly
questionable.
While Giddens and Stern both support springboard
approaches with market-based steering, the former
favours carbon taxation while the latter opts for carbon
trading as the key policy instrument, citing the greater
regulatory certainty of emission caps and the private sec-
tor flows of finance available for transfer from rich to
poor countries (Stern, pp. 103–104). However, as both
Giddens (pp. 197–202) and Nordhaus (pp. 159–161)
caution, the record on carbon trading is at best mixed
(e.g. European Emissions Trading Scheme), with much
evidence of inefficient rent seeking. Carbon trading must
be embedded in smarter governance institutions. Giddens
is most insightful on the politics of climate change
action and cooperation; in particular, how action to limit
global warming needs to converge with supporting politi-
cal and economic goals (e.g. energy security, low-carbon
growth). At the geopolitical level, he highlights the
relationships of power that must be accommodated in
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international climate negotiations (Giddens, pp. 203–226).
This political realism is a necessary corrective to the
rational optimism of Stern’s ‘global deal’ on climate
change, including his argument for a world environment
organisation (Stern, pp. 200–202). Nevertheless, in so far
as we must fall back on risk-based analysis to identify
common interests and inspire practical action on climate
change, then I know of no better starting point than A
Blueprint for a Safer Planet.
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